The state-sponsored cyberattack group known as Billbug managed to compromise a digital certificate authority (CA) as part of an wide-ranging espionage campaign that stretched back to March — a concerning development in the advanced persistent threat (APT) playbook, researchers warn.
Digital certificates are files that are used to sign software as valid, and verify the identity of a device or user to enable encrypted connections. As such, a CA compromise could lead to a legion of stealthy follow-on attacks.
“The targeting of a certificate authority is notable, as if the attackers were able to successfully compromise it to access certificates, they could potentially use them to sign malware with a valid certificate, and help it avoid detection on victim machines,” according to a report this week from Symantec. “It could also potentially use compromised certificates to intercept HTTPS traffic.”
“This is potentially very dangerous,” the researchers noted.
An Ongoing Spate of Cyber-Compromises
Billbug (aka Lotus Blossom or Thrip) is a China-based espionage group that mainly targets victims in Southeast Asia. It’s known for big-game hunting — i.e., going after the secrets held by military organizations, governmental entities, and communications providers. Sometimes it casts a broader net, hinting at darker motivations: In one past instance, it infiltrated an aerospace operator to infect the computers that monitor and control the movements of satellites.
In the latest run of nefarious activity, the APT hit a pantheon of government and defense agencies throughout Asia, in one case infesting “a large number of machines” on a government network with its custom malware.
“This campaign was ongoing from at least March 2022 to September 2022, and it is possible this activity may be ongoing,” says Brigid O Gorman, senior intelligence analyst at Symantec Threat Hunter Team. “Billbug is a long-established threat group that has carried out multiple campaigns over the years. It is possible that this activity could extend to additional organizations or geographies, though Symantec has no evidence of that at the moment.”
A Familiar Approach to Cyberattacks
At those targets as well as at the CA, the initial access vector has been the exploitation of vulnerable, public-facing applications. After gaining the ability to execute code, the threat actors go on to install their known, custom Hannotog or Sagerunex backdoors before burrowing deeper into networks.
For the later kill-chain stages, Billbug attackers use multiple living-off-the-land binaries (LoLBins), such as AdFind, Certutil, NBTscan, Ping, Port Scanner, Route, Tracert, Winmail, and WinRAR, according to Symantec’s report.
These legitimate tools can be abused for various doppelganger uses, such as querying Active Directory to map a network, ZIP-ing files for exfiltration, uncovering paths between endpoints, scanning NetBIOS and ports, and installing browser root certificates — not to mention downloading additional malware.
The custom backdoors combined with dual-use tools is a familiar footprint, having been used by the APT in the past. But the lack of concern about public exposure is par for the course for the group.
“It’s notable that Billbug appears to be undeterred by the possibility of having this activity attributed to it, with it reusing tools that have been linked to the group in the past,” says Gorman.
She adds, “The group’s heavy use of living off the land and dual-use tools is also notable, and underlines the need for organizations to have in place security products that can not only detect malware, but can also recognize if legitimate tools are potentially being used in a suspicious or malicious manner.”
Symantec has notified the unnamed CA in question to inform it of the activity, but Gorman declined to offer further details as to its response or remediation efforts.
While there’s no indication so far that the group was able to go on to compromise actual digital certificates, the researcher advises, “Enterprises should be aware that malware could be signed with valid certificates if threat actors are able to achieve access to cert authorities.”
In general, organizations should adopt a defense-in-depth strategy, using multiple detection, protection, and hardening technologies to mitigate risk at each point of a potential attack chain, she says.
“Symantec would also advise implementing proper audit and control of administrative account usage,” Gorman noted. “We’d also suggest creating profiles of usage for admin tools as many of these tools are used by attackers to move laterally undetected through a network. Across the board, multifactor authentication (MFA) can help limit the usefulness of compromised credentials.”
