Študija primera kripto analize – 'Three Arrows Capital': DEL IV (Rodrigo Zepeda)

Rodrigo Zepeda, izvršni direktor Storm-7 Consulting

Predstavitev

In Del IV tega 'Kapital s tremi puščicami"(3AC) Študija primera, bomo podali analizo razlogov, zakaj menim, da je monetarna uprava Singapurja (VEČ)
ni v svoji dolžnosti nadzorne sposobnosti v odnosu do ustreznega, preudarnega in pravočasnega nadzora podjetja in kako je ta neuspeh morda nazadnje prispeval k njegovemu propadu v
junij 2022. v Del Ismo ugotovili, da "Three Arrows Capital Ptd. doo"(3AC
Singapur) je bila registrirana kot „registrirana družba za upravljanje skladov“ (RFMC) v Singapurju v
avgust 2013.

Veljavni 'Smernice
on Licensing, Registration and Conduct of Business for Fund Management Companies« (št. smernice: SFA 04-G05), so bili tisti z datumom izdaje
7 avgust 2012 (Smernice MAS 2012). Kot del svojih zahtev za pridobitev dovoljenja RFMC je moral 3AC Singapore služiti le do 30 kvalificiranim vlagateljem in upravljati sredstva v vrednosti največ
250 milijonov singapurski dolar (SGD). To znaša £ 150 milijonov or
$ 179.78 milijonov (približno $ 180 milijonov).

On 30 junij 2022, je MAS objavil sporočilo za medije o izvršilnih ukrepih, v katerem je navedeno, da je grajal 3AC Singapore zaradi zagotavljanja lažnih informacij in prekoračitve sredstev v upravljanju (AuM) prag za pooblaščeno RFMC (VEČ
2022). MAS je poročal, da je 3AC Singapore prekršil zakon 1 leto
skupaj, med julij 2020 in september 2020in med
november 2020 in avgust 2021 (VEČ
2022). Poleg tega je MAS izrecno izjavil, da preiskuje kršitve 3AC Singapore od
junij 2021 (VEČ
2022).

To facilitate this analysis, we will first set out an overview of investment fund regulatory frameworks relevant to the authorisation and supervision of investment funds in general. Thereafter, we will provide an overview of crypto asset risks and relevant
crypto fund risk management practices. We will also set out an evolutionary timeline of the crypto ecosystem and regulation in Singapore to provide operational context.

Pregled regulativnih okvirov investicijskih skladov

Splošni pristop k urejanju in nadzoru delovanja vrste investicijskih skladov je v praksi zelo obsežno razvit. Z vidika visoke ravni so reforme G20, ki so sledile
2008 do 2009 Velika finančna kriza (GFC) je neposredno obravnaval podrobne reforme, namenjene zagotavljanju bolj odpornega svetovnega finančnega sistema. Tukaj bomo uporabili reforme, ki so bile izvedene v Evropski uniji (EU) to illustrate the
general regulatory approach adopted.

V Evropi je to potekalo v obliki strukturnih regulativnih reform GFC, ki so bile usmerjene na zapletene in nepregledne finančne instrumente, kot so prosti (OTC) derivatives, as well as a range of financial services firms, including investment funds. In particular,
the ‘Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive’ (Direktiva 2011 / 61 / EU) (AIFMD), ki je začela veljati v
2011, je skušal določiti stroge regulativne zahteve za hedge sklade, investicijske sklade, sklade zasebnega kapitala in druge sklade.

The provisions within the AIFMD covered a range of detailed operational requirements pertaining to key areas such as asset valuation; authorisation; capital requirements; conduct of business standards; delegation; depositaries; marketing; remuneration; reporting;
and transparency. As a result, the authorisation and supervision of investment funds in general across different jurisdictions, typically covers a range of requirements for funds covering these areas. This area is well understood.

„Uredba o evropski tržni infrastrukturi“ (Uredba (EU) št. 648 / 2012) (EMIR) je začela veljati v
2012 in je bil uzakonjen, da bi določil kliring izvedenih finančnih instrumentov OTC prek centralnih nasprotnih strank (CCP); to implement derivatives reporting requirements; and to implement risk mitigation and collateral exchange requirements for OTC derivatives
that were not cleared. The EMIR was intended to mitigate credit risk, reduce operational risk, and enhance transparency within authorised firms.

There were masses of detailed standards developed to implement these market reforms, as well as thousands of publications dedicated to analysing and assessing in detail risks and operational requirements relating to the implementation of these new regulatory
frameworks in practice. These were available for all national regulatory authorities to draw upon, including MAS. These types of regulatory frameworks are very important.

This is because they have now become standardised in nature, and they provide a foundational framework from which it is possible to further analyse the potential risks arising from crypto investments undertaken by crypto investment firms and funds. For example,
a global securities markets risk outlook published in 2016, identified ways that investment funds could potentially impact financial stability, these were through the use of leverage, and their level of interconnectedness with banks or systemically
important infrastructures (OICV-IOSCO 2016P. 81). Ugotovljeno je bilo, da:

"Medtem ko je uporaba finančnega vzvoda in izvedenih finančnih instrumentov v sektorju na splošno omejena s predpisi in zato nizka, lahko uporaba izvedenih finančnih instrumentov povzroči posredne učinke prek zahtev glede zavarovanja s premoženjem in kritja."
(OICV-IOSCO 2016P. 81).

As a result, we know that the use of leverage and counterparty interconnectedness is something that we may also need to be on the lookout for in crypto investment funds. This potential use of leverage and level of interconnectedness would be a risk that
arises in relation to traditional investments in complex opaque financial instruments such as derivatives, in much the same way as investments in complex opaque cryptocurrencies. Indeed, we saw in
Del II how 3AC was operating what I referred to as ‘triple leveraged trading’, which represented
a huge operational risk for the firm.

Posledično, če je uporaba finančnega vzvoda in kriptovalut ne constrained by regulation, then clearly such use needs to be analysed in order to identify the risks that arise. Otherwise, the use of leverage in crypto investments represents a risk
that remains unaddressed, unmitigated, and unsupervised. Such risks are in addition to the stated knock-on effects that may arise via collateral and margin requirements, which are applicable to both OTC derivatives
in kriptovalute. V skladu z uredbo EMIR se ta tveganja obravnavajo s centralnim kliringom izvedenih finančnih instrumentov OTC prek CNS ali z dodatnimi tehnikami za zmanjševanje tveganja, ki se uporabljajo pri uporabi izvedenih finančnih instrumentov OTC brez kliringa.

So, for example, risks are addressed by requiring the use of high quality, liquid, margin (CCP cleared) and/or collateral (non-cleared), and the use of standardised ‘haircuts’, i.e., valuation discounts applied to take into account potential liquidity and
market risks in times of market volatility. If we know exactly how and why these risks are dealt with under EMIR, then we would logically look to see how these risks are dealt with when trading cryptocurrencies. As will be seen in
Del V, to so natanko vrste tveganj, ki so se pojavila v zvezi s kripto naložbami, ki jih izvaja 3AC Singapore.

The use of the AIFMD/EMIR frameworks is therefore highly relevant and useful, precisely because they illustrate how the risks inherent in investments made by funds in complex and opaque OTC derivatives, can be effectively mitigated in practice. The same
types of investment risks can be analysed with respect to crypto asset investments. However, it should be noted that a supervision report published by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen
(FI)) analizirala tveganja kripto naložb (FI 2021).

V tem poročilu je FI zavzel stališče, da so finančni instrumenti, ki temeljijo na kripto sredstvih, pravzaprav še bolj tvegani kot številni drugi produkti z visokim tveganjem, kot so izvedeni finančni instrumenti (FI
2021P. 17). In theory, this meant that crypto asset investments might demand even more extensive risk management practices than those required for OTC derivatives under EMIR. The FI said that this was because they lacked intrinsic value; there was
no generally accepted reliable models for valuation; they were generally not subject to consumer protection regulation; and they were frequently used for money laundering and terrorist financing (FI
2021P. 17).

Pregled tveganj kripto sredstev in praks upravljanja tveganj kripto skladov

V svoji razpravi o premislekih, ki jih je treba upoštevati v zvezi z regulacijo skladov kripto sredstev, je združenje Irish Funds opredelilo številna ključna tveganja, ki so se pojavila v zvezi s kripto sredstvi (Irski
Funds 2022P. 22). To je vključevalo tveganja v zvezi z:

(1) odsotnost zaščite;

(2) ekstremna gibanja cen (npr. cena morda ni podprta s sredstvi);

(3) goljufije in zlonamerne dejavnosti;

(4) vdori, operativna tveganja in varnostna vprašanja;

(5) tržna manipulacija (npr. imetja kripto sredstev so lahko visoko koncentrirana, kar vpliva na cene in likvidnost);

(6) zavajajoče informacije; in

(7) zapletenost produkta (s funkcijami, kot je finančni vzvod, ki lahko povečajo obseg izgub v primeru neugodnih gibanj cen) (Irski
Funds 202222-23).

Za obravnavo izzivov, ki izhajajo iz razdrobljene narave trga kripto sredstev, je bilo priporočeno, da podjetja izvedejo ustrezne operativne prilagoditve za zajemanje in obvladovanje tveganja (Irski
Funds 2022P. 25). In practice, these would relate to a firm’s selection and connection with trading platforms; its assimilation of 24/7 trading and settlement cycles; and its tracking and assessment of fair value across multiple “always on” exchanges
operating in a volatile marketplace (Irski skladi 2022P. 25).

Odbor za standarde za alternativne naložbe (SBai) objavil podrobnejše smernice v zvezi s skrbnim pregledom poslovanja (ODD) zahteve glede kripto sredstev (SBai
2021). To je zagotovilo smernice v zvezi s ključnimi področji ODD, ki zajemajo navzkrižja interesov; pripor; regulativno tveganje; trgovinski procesi; ter vrednotenje in preverjanje premoženja (SBai
2021P. 1). Novejša raziskovalna študija je pokazala, da je strogost ODD na kripto naložbe in upravljavce premoženja naraščala, ko je več institucionalnega kapitala vstopilo v kripto prostor (Scharfman
2022P. 44).

V zvezi s pričakovanji obvladovanja tveganja v zvezi s kripto sredstvi je avstralski nadzorni organ (APRA) navaja, da pričakuje, da bodo vsi regulirani subjekti sprejeli a
preudarno pristop če izvajajo dejavnosti, povezane s kripto sredstvi (APRA
2022P. 1). To je vključevalo zagotavljanje, da so bila vsa tveganja dobro razumljena in dobro obvladovana pred uvedbo kakršnih koli pomembnih novih pobud (APRA
2022P. 1). Posledično je APRA pričakovala, da bodo podjetja izvedla ustrezno skrbnost in celovito oceno tveganja, preden se vključijo v dejavnosti kripto sredstev, ter uvedla ustrezne ukrepe za zmanjšanje tveganja (APRA
2022P. 1).

APRA je tudi izjavila, da pričakuje, da bodo podjetja uporabljala robusten nadzor obvladovanja tveganja, ki je vključeval jasno odgovornost, in ustrezno poročanje upravnemu odboru o ključnih tveganjih, povezanih s kakršnimi koli novimi podvigi kripto sredstev (APRA
2022P. 2). For investments in crypto assets, firms were required to identify and assess a range of prudential risks pertaining to key areas such as capital management; investment risk; operational risk; as well as other risks, e.g., implications
for liquidity management, market risk management, and large exposures measurement (APRA
2022P. 4).

Razvoj kripto ekosistema in ureditev v Singapurju

In Del III
tega Študija primera, smo ugotovili, da je bilo širjenje blockchain in kriptotehnologij ter naložb v Singapurju veliko opazno v medijih in sega vsaj v
2015. Takšen razvoj je nastal v skladu s pozicioniranjem singapurske vlade kot finančne tehnologije (FINTECH) in kot "kripto središče" za mednarodno trgovino. Pravzaprav v
januar 2016 singapurski konzorcij FinTech je poudaril ogromno raznolikost sektorjev FinTech, ki so takrat že obstajali v Singapurju (Singapur
FinTech Consortium 2016).

Takšni sektorji FinTech so vključevali: bančno infrastrukturo; finančne raziskave/analitika; finančno usposabljanje; institucionalne naložbe; posojanje; plačila/nakazila; osebne finance/bogastvo; in bančništvo na drobno/naložbe (Singapur
FinTech Consortium 2016P. 17). V 2017, MAS published ‘A Guide to Digital Token Offerings’, which provided guidance on the application of securities laws administered by MAS with respect to offers or issues of digital tokens (e.g., Initial
Coin Offering (ICO)) v Singapurju (VEČ
2017).

In avgust 2017, je MAS objavil uradne smernice v obliki svojih „Potrošniških nasvetov o naložbenih shemah, ki vključujejo digitalne žetone (vključno z virtualnimi valutami)“ (VEČ
(August) 2017). V tem nasvetu je izrecno opredelil tveganja, na katera morajo biti potrošniki pozorni pri ocenjevanju ICO in drugih naložbenih shem, ki vključujejo digitalne žetone (VEČ
(August) 2017). Ti vključujejo med drugim tveganja v zvezi z:

(1) tuji in spletni operaterji;

(2) prodajalci brez dokazanih izkušenj;

(3) nezadostna likvidnost sekundarnega trga;

(4) zelo špekulativne naložbe; in

(5) naložbe, ki obljubljajo visoke donose (MAS (avgust) 2017).

In december 2017, je MAS celo izrecno opozoril javnost »ravnati skrajno previdno in razumeti pomembna tveganja, ki jih prevzamejo, če se odločijo vlagati v kriptovalute"(VEČ
(December) 2017). Izrecno je navedlo, da MAS ni urejal kriptovalut in da ni bilo vzpostavljenih regulativnih zaščitnih ukrepov za naložbe v kriptovalute (VEČ
(December) 2017). Nadalje je navedeno: »Prav tako se predpisi MAS ne nanašajo na varnost in zanesljivost posrednikov kriptovalut ali pravilno obdelavo transakcij s kriptovalutami."(VEČ
(December) 2017).

Od takrat je vrsta nadnacionalnih in drugih organizacij objavila obsežne in podrobne smernice v zvezi z
med drugim kripto ekosistem in izzivi finančne stabilnosti; tveganja za finančno stabilnost zaradi kripto sredstev; in tveganja, ki se nanašajo na skrbno obravnavo izpostavljenosti kriptosredstev, če omenimo le nekatere (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 2021; Mednarodni denarni sklad 2021;
Odbor za finančno stabilnost 2022).

Posledično je obstajala podrobna analiza in poznavanje vrst tveganj, ki bi lahko nastala zaradi naložb v kripto sredstva in poslovanja kriptoinvesticijskih podjetij. Poleg tega je bilo ugotovljeno, da je v
2017 je bilo že približno 167 hedge skladov, ki so bili odprti za vlaganje v kriptovalute in ICO, in da je do sredinemarec 2018, je bilo na svetu več kot 220 skladov, osredotočenih na kripto (Sheng
2017).

Torej, z 2017/2018, so bili kriptoinvesticijski skladi že široko uveljavljeni, priznani in delujoči po vsem svetu. Vklopljeno
14 januar 2019, je parlament v Singapurju sprejel
Zakon o plačilnih storitvah 2019 (št. 2 iz 2019) (PSA 2019), ki je poskušal določiti nov regulativni okvir za ureditev plačilnih sistemov in ponudnikov plačilnih storitev v Singapurju (VEČ
2019). Ta zakon je začel veljati v januar 2020.

Pomembna točka, ki jo je treba upoštevati pri razvoju te industrije, je, da v 2021 poročali so, da čeprav je 170 podjetij zaprosilo za licenco MAS v okviru PSA 2019, so samo tri kripto podjetja dejansko prejele zelo želene licence (Chanjaroen,
Amin, Ossinger 2021). Ne samo, da si je MAS prizadeval obsežno sodelovati s podjetji kandidatkami, ampak je bilo tudi ugotovljeno, da je MAS znatno povečal svoje vire, da bi se spopadel z velikim številom bodočih ponudnikov storitev (Chanjaroen,
Amin, Ossinger 2021).

Tako je MAS v tem času izrecno razširil svoje notranje vire, tako da je imel dovolj notranjega osebja, ki je bilo dovolj usposobljeno, da je lahko izvajalo poglobljeno analizo poslovanja prijaviteljev kripto podjetij. Vklopljeno
17 januar 2022, je MAS izdal nove smernice za odvračanje od trgovanja s kriptovalutami s strani širše javnosti v Singapurju (VEČ
(January) 2022). „Smernice o zagotavljanju storitev digitalnih plačilnih žetonov javnosti“ določajo pričakovanja, da digitalni plačilni žeton (DPT) service providers should not promote their DPT services to the general public in Singapore
(MAS (januar) 2022).

Neuspeh MAS pri izpolnjevanju dolžnosti nadzorne zmogljivosti

Da bi analiziral neuspeh MAS pri izpolnjevanju svoje naloge nadzora, se bom postavil na mesto preiskovalnega uradnika MAS (MAS IO) assigned this case, which would be close to identical to the way I would approach this situation if our firm
(Svetovanje Storm-7) so bili vpoklicani kot zunanje svetovalno podjetje za skladnost s predpisi. Avtor:
avgust 2018, 3AC Singapore je deloval od pet let. Šlo za uveljavljen investicijski sklad, ki ga
shouldnt so imeli vzpostavljeno učinkovito funkcijo skladnosti, ki je vključevala uradnike za skladnost in vodjo skladnosti.

Prej smo ugotovili, da je bila njegova edina prevladujoča zahteva za avtorizacijo zagotoviti, da ne preseže praga RFMC AuM. V ta namen pod "VEČ
Guidelines on Risk Management Practices – Internal Controls« so morali uradniki za skladnost poročati upravnemu odboru 3AC Singapore o kakršnih koli bistvenih kršitvah skladnosti in statusu vseh sprejetih ukrepov (Cavenagh
Law LLP 2019). Poleg tega se je od vodje skladnosti pričakovalo, da bo neposredno obvestil predsednika upravnega odbora v primeru večje neskladnosti s strani vodstva ali pomembne neskladnosti s strani podjetja (Cavenagh
Law LLP 2019).  

Kot "Družba za upravljanje skladov" (FMC), je moral 3AC Singapore nemudoma obvestiti MAS, če je prekršil svojo zahtevo za licenciranje praga RFMC AuM, in nemudoma ukrepati za odpravo takšne kršitve (VEČ
2012 SmerniceP. 10). Vemo, da je MAS začel preiskovati kršitve 3AC Singapore leta
junij 2021, in da je podjetje prvič preseglo odobreni prag RFMC v višini
$ 180 milijonov zgodilo v julij 2020 (VEČ
2022). To bi moralo takoj opozoriti MAS.

As MAS IO, I would ask myself why was it that 3AC Singapore breached its authorised RFMC threshold one year prior, but had still failed to notify MAS? I would ask myself, was this a technical error or oversight, or were there failures in its internal compliance
function? The fact that I was investigating several potential contraventions would tend to indicate that it could be a failure in its compliance function. The initial focus of the investigation, however, should have been on the valuation of its assets, because
this was the only overriding authorisation requirement for 3AC Singapore.

In addition, the investigation should have been time sensitive. If I believed that 3AC Singapore had breached its authorised RFMC AuM threshold, this could mean that it was operating on an unlicensed basis, i.e., it should have been adhering to much stricter
licensing requirements for a Licensed FMC (LFMC). Videli smo noter Del III that there is a huge
difference in the operational requirements for LFMCs compared to a RFMC. In practice, the MAS objectives of supervision include securing a stable financial system; securing safe and sound financial intermediaries; and securing fair, efficient and transparent
organised markets (VEČ
2015P. 4).

Dve nadzorni funkciji MAS sta avtorizacija in nadzor (VEČ
2015, str.19-20). Taken together, these mean that the initial priority should have been to identify as soon as possible whether the breach of the authorised RFMC AuM threshold represented a potential market risk and/or even systemic risk. Was this an
AuM threshold breach of $ 1 milijonov, ali kršitev $ 50 milijonov? Razlika bi lahko bila ključna za integriteto organiziranih trgov v Singapurju, zato bi morala predstavljati časovno občutljivo zadevo.

In Del II, smo videli, da bi lahko uporabilo podjetje za kripto investicije, ki uporablja razmerje finančnega vzvoda 10:1
$ 50 milijonov za nadzor a $ 500 milijonov kripto trgovina. Torej, kršitev praga AuM celo
$ 10 milijonov lahko pomeni, da je v resnici taka kršitev dejansko nadzorovana
$ 100 milijonov kripto naložb, ne samo $ 10 milijonov. v Del III
hitro nam je uspelo ugotoviti, da RFMC ni treba imeti kapitala, ki temelji na tveganju (RBC), in da je moral 3AC Singapore le zadržati
$180,000 v kapitalu, tj. 1/1000 svoje skupne omejitve kapitalskih naložb.

So, for me, as a MAS IO, this represents a red flag warning. If 3AC Singapore was operating with a significant excess of AuM, it would mean that it had internal compliance and risk management functions specifically designed to manage risk at much lower risk
levels, that were actually being used to manage risk at much higher risk levels. That is a big problem. For example, if 3AC Singapore was utilising leverage in its investment strategies, this could mean that it was exposing its market counterparties to significant
non-disclosed risks.

There could be potential contagion risks arising because of the level of interconnectedness existing between market counterparties, as well as knock-on effects through the use of collateral and lending practices. As MAS IO, I would immediately prioritise
finding out if the RFMC AuM threshold breach gave rise to any potential counterparty, market, or systemic risks. As MAS IO my initial immediate focus would have been on:

(1) ugotavljanje, zakaj je prišlo do kršitve (ali kršitev) praga RFMC AuM;

(2) če so predstavljali potencialno tveganje nasprotne stranke, tržno ali sistemsko tveganje;

(3) zakaj 3AC Singapore ni nemudoma obvestil družbe MAS o takšnih pomembnih tehničnih kršitvah;  

(4) ali je treba začasno prekiniti delovanje in regulativni status 3AC Singapore in

(5) ali naj se 3AC Singapore registrira kot LFMC.

These would have been primary priority issues because 3AC Singapore operations could have disclosed relevant counterparty, market, or systemic risks. Secondary priority issues would have been investigating 3AC Singapore’s compliance, risk management, and
valuation functions. As MAS IO, I know exactly what I am looking for and how to go about such investigation because the general investment fund regulatory approach has been set out in the AIFMD/EMIR frameworks, as well as a range of MAS guidance.

In addition, as we saw, there is extensive information available in relation to crypto asset risks, and crypto fund risk management practices. We also saw that I can also draw upon extensive and detailed guidance from supranational institutions relating
to the crypto ecosystem, financial stability challenges and risks, and risks arising from the prudential treatment of crypto asset exposures.

As Singapore had previously intentionally positioned itself as a FinTech centre and crypto hub, it had assumed responsibility for equipping itself with the knowledge and expertise required to effectively regulate crypto investment firms. In fact, we saw
from the range of official guidance that MAS knew and understood the risks of crypto investments, and it even extensively warned the public of such risks. There is no way that MAS can argue that it was understaffed because we saw that it had specifically significantly
boosted its resources to cope with high volumes of crypto firm applications.

Out of 170 PSA 2019 licence applications, MAS had only granted three crypto firm licences. This unequivocally demonstrates that it carried out extremely detailed due diligence and analysis of crypto firm operations. This is what does not make sense. If this
is the approach that MAS adopts to due diligence and analysis of crypto firm operations, why were the extensive problems in compliance, valuation, and risk management functions within 3AC Singapore not identified?

Kot bomo videli v naslednjem Del V tega Študija primera, the compliance management and risk management practices of 3AC Singapore were shambolic. These are not something that would have simply arisen overnight. From the facts we know they certainly
arose in 2022, ker od lahko 2022 do junij 2022 pripeljali so do propada podjetja. Po mojih poklicnih izkušnjah se ne zdijo takšne vrste praks, ki bi jih hitro sprejeli v prostoru samo
4 mesecev (tj. januar 2022-april 2022).

Torej verjamem, da glede na to, da 3AC Singapore ni obvestil MAS, sega v leto
julij 2020, je zelo verjetno da so bili nekaj, kar bi lahko prepoznali v
2021. Opomin MAS 3AC Singapore je bil objavljen dne 30 junij 2022, kar je pomenilo, da MAS še vedno preiskuje 3AC Singapore v
2022. To je v teoriji pomenilo, da bi moral biti MAS sposoben odkriti pomembne težave, ki so obstajale pri notranji skladnosti podjetja, obvladovanju tveganja, vrednotenju sredstev in funkcijah poročanja.

Če bi bil MAS IO, verjamem, da bi jih lahko identificiral, če bi preiskoval podjetje in sem bil prisoten pri izvajanju preiskave v njihovih pisarnah v času
en mesec. Torej, pravo vprašanje je, zakaj je vzel MAS 1 leto
to conduct an investigation? 3AC Singapore had consistently featured in the media around the world, and MAS had specifically positioned itself as a crypto investment firm regulator. It should have understood that crypto investments gave rise to unique risks
that need to be regularly monitored and supervised. Given the unique nature of its crypto investments, this meant that any investigation of 3AC Singapore should have been sufficiently adequate and prudent in nature.

Consequently, as a MAS IO, the potential misuse of leverage, complex crypto investments, and complex crypto lending practices is something that I would have, and should have, been on the lookout for. If there were potential issues or problems with internal
compliance and risk management functions of a crypto investment fund, other risks that I should have been on the lookout for were the use of crypto leverage from unregulated firms; the use of low quality crypto margin; the use of minimal, or lack of, apposite
crypto margin haircuts; and potential market and liquidity risks.

MAS je svojo preiskavo začel leta junij 2021 in objavila obvestilo o opominu v
junij 2022. Tako je 1 leto in which MAS investigated 3AC Singapore but failed to suspend 3AC Singapore operations, and it failed to require 3AC Singapore to register as a LFMC. This is despite the fact that 3AC Singapore broke the law by breaching
its RFMC AuM threshold for 1 leto skupaj. V resnici, ko je MAS potrdil, da je 3AC Singapore presegel svoj prag AuM med
november 2020 in avgust 2021 (10 mesecev), to je natančna točka, ko bi morala 3AC Singapur takoj zahtevati, da se registrira kot LFMC.

In practice, this would have required 3AC Singapore to implement highly extensive, and much more stringent, compliance and risk management requirements, including much higher RBC and capital obligations. It would also have required much more stringent and
detailed risk management requirements pertaining to the use of leverage in crypto trades and investments, which was likely one of the primary causes of the ultimate failure of 3AC Singapore. I believe that if 3AC Singapore had been required to implement these
huge operational changes, it is possible the firm would not have failed, or alternatively that its losses would not have been so massive.

If as MAS IO, I would had conducted a proper extensive and thorough examination of 3AC Singapore’s practices, the likelihood is that I would have easily found sufficient evidence to require me to order 3AC Singapore to register as a LFMC. That is why I believe
that MAS ni in its duty of supervisory capacity vis-à-vis the adequate, prudent, and timely supervision of 3AC Singapore. It is also why I believe that if 3AC Singapore had been required to register as a LFMC by MAS, the new operational requirements
imposed on the firm may have prevented its collapse, or at the very least, mitigated the financial impact of its collapse, and the collapse of other market firms in
junij 2022.

Se nadaljuje.